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Saving Incommensurability: Semantic
Theory of Meaning or Semantic Theory of
Science?1
Soazig Le Bihan
LPHS, Université Nancy 2; Universität Bielefeld
Résumé : L’article de Carrier a pour but principal de reconstruire la notion
d’incommensurabilité sur la base de la théorie contextuelle de la signification.
C’est cette reconstruction dite sémantique que je discuterai ici. La stratégie
de Carrier consiste à exhiber deux cas d’incommensurabilité sur la base d’une
preuve symétrique d’intraductibilité, elle-même fondée sur la distinction entre
deux éléments déterminant la signification d’un concept. Je montrerai princi-
palement que la symétrie de l’argument est fautive et que la distinction sur
laquelle il est fondée ne tient pas. J’argumenterai ensuite en faveur de la reva-
lorisation d’une notion qui joue un rôle secondaire dans l’argument de Carrier,
savoir « l’ensemble des situations dans lesquelles le concept est correctement
appliqué », tant pour la détermination de la signification d’un concept que
pour l’évaluation de la notion d’incommensurabilité. Je tenterai d’ouvrir enfin
une autre voie pour la reconstruction de l’incommensurabilité, fondée, non pas
sur la théorie sémantique de la signification, mais sur la théorie sémantique
des sciences.
Abstract: Carrier’s paper is mainly a defence of incommensurability as “a sen-
sible notion”, on the basis of the context theory of meaning. I shall here discuss
1Comment on Martin Carrier, “Semantic Incommensurability and Empirical Com-
parability: the Case of Lorentz and Einstein”. I would like to thank Robert Nola, as
well as Anouk Barberousse, who have both offered comments and advice, and forced
me to present my ideas in a much clearer way, even if they are certainly not the ones
to blame for the theses developped here, of which I take on the responsability.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 8 (1), 2004, 97–105.
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his semantic reconstruction of the notion. His argument consists in exhibit-
ing cases where incommensurability is instantiated thanks to a symmetrical
proof of untranslatability, based on a distinction between two determinants
of the meaning of a concept. I shall mainly show that a logical asymmetry
in the distinction hinders the argument from achieving its goal. I shall then
defend that a notion that plays a secondary role in Carrier’s argument, i.e.
“the set of situation to which a concept is properly applied”, should be placed
at centre stage for the determination of the meaning of a concept and thence
for the appraisal of the notion of incommensurability. I shall finally sketch an
alternative reconstruction of the notion of incommensurability, based on the
semantic view of science instead of the semantic theory of meaning.
The aim of Carrier’s paper appears to be mainly a defence of in-
commensurability as, I quote, “a sensible notion”. At the end of the
paper, Carrier briefly sketches an answer to the usual misunderstand-
ing of incommensurability as implying empirical incomparability. But
it is unclear whether this is logically linked to the earlier parts. What
is really at stake in the paper is the existence and the coherence of the
very notion of incommensurability. The core of the paper is constituted
by the attempt to prove that the context theory of meaning provides a
good basis for a sound reconstruction of incommensurability.
I will not discuss whether the sound and clear reconstruction of the
notion of incommensurability is possible, or even needed, for Kuhn’s
work. Nor will I cast doubt on the thesis that incommensurability does
not imply empirical incomparability and relativism of theory choice.
However, I am not completely convinced by Carrier’s reconstruction of
incommensurability on the basis of the context theory of meaning. More
precisely, his argument hinges on a distinction between two determinants
of the meaning of a concept. With this distinction in hand, he tries to
construct a symmetrical argument, to prove that some cases of incom-
mensurability, understood as untranslatability, are instantiated in the
history of science. I shall mainly show that there is a logical asymmetry
in the distinction that hinders the argument from achieving its goal. I
shall then defend that the notion of “the set of situations to which a con-
cept is properly applied” is, and appears to be in Carrier’s case studies,
more central for the determination of the meaning of a concept than the
two determinants he gives us.
I shall then try to give an alternative basis for a reconstruction of the
notion of incommensurability. The idea is that using a context view on
meaning is going the right way, but is still not enough. It is going the
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right way, because it takes scientific theories as wholes, in which concepts
are integrated. It is not enough, because it still takes the translatability
of concepts, and not the congruence of structures, as a primary basis
for theory comparison. My proposal is that the semantic view of sci-
ence may be a better basis. It could offer a simple way to understand
incommensurability.
1. Carrier’s symmetrical argument
Carrier’s argument is based on the context theory of meaning, from
which he deduces a context theory of translation. He gives a sketch of
it in section 2. If one looks at Carrier’s summary of this section (p.77),
everything seems quite clear:
On the whole, then, the theoretical context account recognizes two chief de-
terminants of the meaning of concepts. First, the inferential integration of
a concept which is specified by its relations to other concepts. The integra-
tion of scientific concepts, in particular, is furnished, among other things,
by the relevant laws or theories. Second, the conditions of application
which are determined by the set of situations to which a concept is thought
to apply (or not to apply respectively). To these two sources of meaning
correspond two constraints on adequate translations. Rendering a concept
appropriately demands, first, the preservation of the relevant inferential
relations, and, second, the retention of the conditions of application.
In this paragraph, Carrier precisely defines two determinants of the
meaning of concepts: the inferential integration (call these (ii)) and the
conditions of application (call these (ca)). To these correspond two crite-
ria for a good translation, that is, the preservation of each determinant.
This distinction is of high importance for Carrier’s argument. It
serves as a basis for his comparison between concepts of Lorentzian and
Einsteinian theories. Indeed, he wants to prove that there are concepts
from the two theories that are not translatable from one to the other,
and hence that semantic incommensurability holds between them. Case
1 deals with velocity, case 2 with mass. In both cases, Carrier’s argument
proceeds in two symmetric stages, each of which shows that satisfaction
of one of the requirement implies dissatisfaction of the other one.
The first one is to translate according to the relevant conditions of appli-
cation. That is, the two terms are applied under the same circumstances.
(. . . ) The catch is that the corresponding predicates do not exhibit the
same inferential relations. (. . . ) The second option is to translate such
that the inferential relations are retained. But, (. . . ) the conditions of
application fail to be preserved.
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Let me call the criteria P (ii) and P (ca) respectively, the preservation
of the inferential integration and the conditions of application, then the
form of Carrier’s argument is as follows.
First, translation based on P (ca) implies a translation failure under
P (ii) requirement:
P (ca)→ ¬P (ii) (1)
Second, translation based on P (ii) implies a translation failure under
P (ca) requirement:
P (ii)→ ¬P (ca) (2)
Hence, translation is hindered, while semantic incommensurability holds
and is finally proved to be “real” or “instantiated”. Thus, the distinction
given above is the very basis of the argument’s structure.
2. The symmetry defeated
Now, consideration of the details of section 2 will show that the situation
is more confused than it appears at first. In particular, the role given to
the notion of “set of situations to which a concept is thought to apply”,
in regard to the determination of meaning, is far from clear. Let us call
(ss) this “set of situation (. . . )”. More precisely, I shall show how the
argument fails because of the relation of (ss) respectively to (ca) and
(ii), that makes the neat distinction fall apart.
In the passage quoted just above, we read that the second chief de-
terminant of the meaning of a concept is “(. . . ) the conditions of appli-
cation which are determined by the set of situations to which a concept
is thought to apply (or not to apply respectively)”. According to this,
(ss) is linked with (ca) in the following way: (ss) determines (ca). (ss)
then has logical priority over (ca), so that we can now write, as Carrier
suggests:
(ss)→ (ca) (3)
Now in the first paragraph of the same section, we were given that (ss)
is linked with (ii); but this link is not very clear:
(. . . ), the meaning of a concept is determined by its relations to other
concepts and the meaning of a statement results from its integration in a
network of other statements. Another way of putting this is to say that
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the use of a concept determines its meaning. What a concept means is
represented by the way in which it is applied to different situations. The
use of scientific concepts is specified by the laws of nature in which these
concepts figure. The meaning of a concept like “electric field” is given by
its lawful connections to related concepts such as electric current, charge
or magnetic field. The concept “electric field” is understood if it is known,
for instance, that such fields are produced by electric currents or variable
magnetic fields and generate changes in the motion of charges, and so forth.
Laws and theories supply a concept with a network of relations to other
concepts, and this network determines to which situations the concept is
properly applied. Such generalizations add to the meaning of the relevant
concepts (my italics and underlining).
The second sentence seems to hold that (ii) and the “use” of a con-
cept are strictly equivalent as to the determination of the meaning of a
concept. The third sentence obviously aims at defining the term “use”,
giving (ss) as its definition. As a consequence, one can say that (ii) and
(ss) are equivalent as to the determination of the meaning of a concept.
(ss)↔ (ii) (4)
However, when Carrier turns to scientific concepts in the last italicised
sentence, the relation seems to lose its simplicity: now (ii), that is, the
laws and theories for a scientific concept, “specify” (ss). Thus, (ii) is
given logical priority over (ss), and this can be now expressed:
(ii)→ (ss) (5)
But now it follows from (3) and (5) that the inferential integration of a
concept determines its conditions of application, at least in the case of
the scientific concepts with which we are dealing here:
(ii)→ (ss)→ (ca) (6)
Two morals can be drawn from this. First, these considerations cer-
tainly point to the ambivalent role given to (ss) in the determination of
the meaning of a concept in Carrier’s paper, although he never seems to
notice it. We proved in (3) that, following Carrier, (ss) determines (ca).
Moreover, independently of Carrier’s consideration of scientific concepts,
we had indeed obtained an equivalence of (ii) and (ss) as to the determi-
nation of the meaning of a concept. Nevertheless, in his paper he gives
(ss) a secondary role and not the central role it may deserve. But let us
deal with this point in the last section. And before that, let us see how
many doubts these logical considerations raise about the validity of the
argument we set out in the first section.
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The argument was based on the independence of, and the symmet-
rical roles, of (ii) and (ca). But since an asymmetrical relation holds
between these, the argument seems not to be valid anymore. In particu-
lar, the second wing is not even logically possible, for one cannot have, at
the same time, sameness, or preservation of, the inferential integration
and difference in the conditions of application if the latter is determined
by the former:
Coming from (6): (ii)→ (ca)
Thus: P (ii)→ P (ca)
Which implies the impossibility of the reasoning:
P (ii)→ ¬P (ca) (2)
that is, the second wing of the argument. Thus, the nice symmetrical
structure of Carrier’s argument falls apart.
A closer look at the details of these alleged symmetrical wings in the
sections concerning the case studies will show that both have really the
same form: whether the preservation of (ii) or (ca) holds or not, the
chief determinant of meaning and translation criterion is (ss). In the
next section, (ss) will be shown to play this central role. I shall then
defend the idea that the semantic view on science provides a better basis
for incommensurability than the context theory of meaning does.
3. Modelling incommensurability?
Reading Carrier’s case studies section, one becomes aware of the fact
that the chief determinant of the meaning of a concept is not the infer-
ential integration and/or the conditions of application, as defined in the
previous sections, but rather the “set of situations to which it is properly
applied”. Let us focus on the respective first stages of the translation
attempt to see how this notion is central even in Carrier’s argument1.
The structure of the argument here appears far less clear than Carrier
wants us to believe. Let Carrier be our guide:
The first try is to focus on conditions of application and to translate ac-
cording to equality of measuring procedures: quantities that are determined
empirically in the same way can be translated into one another.
1We already dealt with the second stages (or wings) in section 2, showing that
Carrier seems to contradict himself.
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In this first paragraph of the translation attempt, Carrier poses the
measuring process to be the conditions of application, as determining
the meaning and serving as a basis for the translation of a scientific
concept. The beginning of the following paragraph stays with what was
announced:
However, the inferential relations fail to be retained.
However, the justification of this statement is rather surprising, for
it concludes indirectly to the difference in theoretical integration, on the
essential basis of the study of “relevant types of situations”:
The disparate conceptual integration of the seemingly identical concepts
of length and velocity becomes conspicuous once the relevant types of sit-
uation, as they emerge in the Lorentzian framework, are reconsidered in
Einsteinian terms. (My italics)
A list of those situations then follows, and Carrier’s argument hinges
on the accurate study of them. Finally, Carrier concludes:
Such differences in judgment indicate a change in the theoretical integration
of the concept of length. (My italics)
In this passage, (ca) and (ii) only play a secondary role: what really
serves as a criterion for a good translation is here called the “relevant
types of situations”, that is (ss). We find ourselves with three determi-
nants of the meaning of a scientific concept: the theoretical integration
(ii), the types of situations to which it applies (ss), and the processes
by which it is measured (ca). No doubt that the last sentence quoted
suggests that there holds a priority relation from the highest (theory) to
the lowest level (measurement) of the determinants of meaning such as
in (6): the sentence says namely that a difference in (ss) has served as
the sign (“indicates”) of the difference in (ii). This can be interpreted
as follows: the non-preservation of (ss) implies the non-preservation in
(ii), which is consistent with (6).
Nevertheless, it seems to me that only the second level, that is the
“relevant types of situations”, has been useful in the practical determi-
nation of the meaning of the Lorenztian and Einsteinian term ‘velocity’.
So that (ss) could be the main determinant of the meaning of a concept
after all. In that case there would be no need of any shaky symmetrical
argument to save the notion of incommensurability, especially if this ar-
gument hinges on the distinction between the inferential integration (ii)
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and the conditions of application (ca), finally identified, in the case stud-
ies, with the old, “orthodox” and controversial distinction between the
theoretical integration and the measuring processes of a concept. The
study of the relevant types of situations to which a concept applies would
then be the key to prove that incommensurability is a sound notion.
An analogous (short) analysis can be conducted on the second case
study about mass. Here again, Carrier narrows the scope of the con-
ditions of applications to the measuring processes. Then he uses the
ways in which the two theories “capture [a] situation” (p.10) (my italics)
as sufficient determinants of the meaning of the concept they include.
Finally the difference in these ways is considered as a sufficient reason
to draw the conclusion that there must be a difference in its theoretical
integration. In the end, Carrier’s first distinction between two deter-
minants of meaning does not play the role it was supposed to play in
the case studies. On the whole, the meaning of a concept appears to be
sufficiently determined by the “set of situations”, or maybe better to say
“the relevant types of situations” to which the concept applies.
Probably the late Kuhn’s theory of kinds would appear as the natural
development of my argument here. And in fact, section 5 of Carrier’s
paper does refer to it, and appraises his view on incommensurability
in contrast with it. Here Carrier applies the same bottom-up type of
argument to give a secondary role to the change of taxonomies of natural
kinds between theories as when he dealt with the ways in which theories
capture relevant types of situations to which the concept applies.
Incommensurable concepts emerge if, owing to nomological change, natural
kinds are restructured. If a new system of laws is adopted that conflict with
a previous one, the former equivalence classes split up into heterogeneous
components and realign to form new taxonomic structures. This change
of the class of properties to which a concept is rightly applied goes back
to a change in the nomological integration of this concept. The use of
electrodynamic and relativistic concepts is governed by contrasting sets of
laws. It is this nomological contrast that constitutes the ultimate reason for
the translation failure. The dissolution and the new formation of natural
kinds which is placed at center stage by Kuhn is a proximate reason that
follows from the divergence of the relevant inferential relations. (My italics)
I will not go further in the discussion and appraisal of the late Kuhn’s
theory. So let me, as an end to this already too long comment, run the
risk of giving an alternative proposal. It seems to me that Carrier’s
notion of “theoretical”, “nomological”, or “inferential integration” is not
clear enough. At first (see (4)), it was equivalent with the set of situations
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to which a concept properly applies. At a second stage Carrier tried (see
(5)) to give it a logical priority. But then the risk is, as in the first
stage of the first case study, to go back to the orthodox distinction that
I am sure Carrier does not want to defend. That may be the reason
why he distinguishes in parenthesis (see p.85) his notion from the simple
mathematical formulas in the second case study, maybe feeling the old
orthodox theory lurking behind his words. More seriously, the notion is
either too broad or too narrow, and I claim that the chief determinant
of meaning appears to be “the relevant types of situations to which a
concept is properly applied”, throughout the paper. And I doubt that
the bottom-up movement from these, or from Kuhn’s taxonomies, sheds
clearer light on the notion of incommensurability.
I now risk the proposal that the notion of “the relevant types of situa-
tions to which a concept is properly applied” is the linguistic formulation
of what an advocate of the semantic theory of science would call a model.
Shifting then from semantic theory of meaning to semantic theory of sci-
ence, we could hope to find an alternative, sound reconstruction of the
notion of incommensurability. Since two theories can be represented by
the set of their models, semantic incommensurability could find a natu-
ral definition as the lack of congruence of some of these models, that is,
the lack of a relation of equivalence between these models that would be
incompatible as regards to internal structure. Looking back to Lorentz
electrodynamics and Einsteinian special relativity, it is interesting to
consider that noting, as Carrier does p.80, that
Lorentz-contraction proper is asymmetric whereas Einstein-contraction is
reciprocal
would be then sufficient to conclude to semantic incommensurability:
the two theories are at least partly incompatible as regard to internal
structure. Carrier’s case studies could be then interpreted as providing
two examples of this incompatibility, concerning velocity and mass. But
this is going far too fast. However, this may deserve further investigation.
The only claims I would defend are the following. First, Carrier’s
argument does not have the nice symmetric form he wants to give to it.
Secondly, the distinction on which the argument hinges is neither clear
enough, nor sheds a brand new light on the notion of incommensurability.
And thirdly, the relationships between the inferential integration and the
set of situations to which a concept is properly applied could be certainly
fruitfully clarified.
